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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Parkinson’s  disease  (PD)  is  associated  with  motor  and  cognitive  impairment  caused  by dopamine  dysreg-
ulation  in the  basal  ganglia.  Amongst  a host  of  cognitive  deﬁcits,  evidence  suggests  that  decision-making
is  impaired  in patients  with  PD,  but the  exact  scope  of  this  impairment  is still  unclear.  The  aim of  this
review  was  to establish  which  experimental  manipulations  commonly  associated  with  studies  involv-
ing  decision-making  tasks  were  most  likely  to  generate  impairments  in  performance  in PD patients.  This
allowed  us  to address  the  question  of the  exact  scope  of  the  decision-making  deﬁcits  in  PD  and  to hypoth-
esize  about  the  role  of  the basal  ganglia  in  decision-making  processes.  We  conducted  a meta-analysis  of
available  literature,  which  revealed  that  the  two  key  predictors  of impairment  in  PD  were  the  feedback
structure  of  the decision-making  task  and  the  medication  status  of  patients  while  performing  the  tasks.
Rather  than  a global  impairment  in  decision-making  ability,  these  ﬁndings  suggest  that deﬁciencies  in
choice-behaviour  in  patients  with  PD  stems  from  dysfunctions  at the outcome  evaluation  stage  of  the
decision-making  process.
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction45
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder pri-46
marily associated with degeneration of dopamine-producing47
neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta. This degeneration48
affects the functioning of the other basal ganglia nuclei, particu-49
larly the putamen, which results in the primary motor symptoms of50
bradykinesia (slowness of movement), akinesia (poverty of action),51
tremor and rigidity. Other symptoms of PD, not related to motor52
functioning, include certain psychiatric disorders (such as depres-53
sion, apathy, anxiety, hallucinations and delusions) and deﬁcits54
in cognitive functioning. It is these cognitive deﬁcits, and more55
speciﬁcally deﬁcits in decision-making, which are the focus of this56
review. In the main, we discuss if the impairments in decision-57
making observed in PD suggest a general deﬁcit affecting all stages58
of the decision-making process, or whether this deﬁcit is limited59
to a speciﬁc stage. We  attempt to address this question in view of60
the available experimental evidence and discuss the implications61
for the role of the basal ganglia in decision-making.62
1.1. General cognitive dysfunction in Parkinson’s disease63
Traditionally, the view has been that the basal ganglia are purely64
motor structures that are important for selection and execution of65
movement. Their role in cognitive functioning has been recognized66
more recently because of the intimate connectivity of the basal gan-67
glia with areas of the frontal cortex which are involved in executive68
functions (e.g. Alexander et al., 1986; Middleton and Strick, 1994)69
(for a review see Middleton and Strick, 2000). Cognitive impair-70
ments observed in people with PD, in whom the basal ganglia are71
affected, provide further support for the importance of the basal72
ganglia for cognitive functioning.73
Cognitive dysfunction in PD can range from mild cognitive74
impairment (MCI), found in the early stages of illness, to demen-75
tia in patients in advanced stages of the disorder (Dirnberger76
and Jahanshahi, 2013; Dubois et al., 2007; Emre et al., 2010;77
Kehagia et al., 2010; Litvan et al., 2012) and impact on impor-78
tant abilities, such as decision-making (Brand et al., 2004; Mimura79
et al., 2006; Pagonabarraga et al., 2007). Executive dysfunction80
in PD is characterized by deﬁcits in internal control of atten-81
tion, set-shifting, planning, reduced ability to perform two tasks82
concurrently, deﬁcits in inhibitory control, and conﬂict resolution83
(Dirnberger and Jahanshahi, 2013). Impairment of executive func-84
tion in Parkinson’s disease is thought to be associated with the85
dysfunction of the associative fronto-striatal loop between the cau-86
date nucleus and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g. Cools et al.,87
2002; Marie et al., 1999).88
Dopaminergic medication has been shown to be effective in89
alleviating many of the motor symptoms associated with PD. How-90
ever, it can have variable effects on cognitive function, either91
improving, or in some cases impairing performance on speciﬁc92
tests. For instance, with dopaminergic medication, performance93
on many tests mediated by the motor or associative circuit94
improves, whereas performance on tests mediated by the limbic95
(ventral striatum-anterior cingulate) or orbitofrontal (caudate-96
orbitofrontal cortex) circuits tends to worsen (Cools, 2001; Gotham97
et al., 1988; Jahanshahi et al., 2010; Swainson et al., 2000). More98
speciﬁcally, dopaminergic medication successfully alleviates some99
working memory, cognitive sequencing and task switching impair- 100
ments in PD (MacDonald and Monchi, 2011). At the same time this 101
medication has been linked to impairments in conditional asso- 102
ciative learning, probabilistic reversal learning, and incremental 103
learning with feedback (e.g. Cools, 2001; Cools et al., 2003, 2007; 104
Gotham et al., 1988; Jahanshahi et al., 2010). To account for this puz- 105
zling set of ﬁndings, the ‘dopamine overdose’ hypothesis (Gotham 106
et al., 1988; Cools et al., 2003) proposes that while dopaminer- 107
gic medication has beneﬁcial effects in the areas of the brain most 108
affected in the early stages of the disease, such as the dorsal stri- 109
atum, it causes overdosing in the parts less affected, such as the 110
ventral striatum. 111
1.2. Speciﬁc cognitive dysfunction in Parkinson’s disease: 112
decision-making 113
In addition to the variable effects of dopaminergic medication on 114
tests of cognitive functioning, another major source of variability in 115
PD patients’ performance is the indices of performance themselves, 116
namely the tests. Studies of decision-making ability in PD are a case 117
in point (Osman, 2011). For instance, some experiments using tasks 118
designed to mimic  risky decision-making (e.g. Iowa Gambling Task 119
(IGT)) revealed impairments in decision-making in PD (e.g. Brand 120
et al., 2004; Kobayakawa et al., 2008; Mimura et al., 2006). Stud- 121
ies utilizing tasks designed to mimic  everyday decision-making 122
(e.g. Dynamic decision-making tasks (DDM)), on the other hand, 123
observed no such deﬁcits (e.g. Osman et al., 2008; Witt et al., 2006). 124
Consequently, inconsistent results presented in the literature on 125
decision-making in PD may  stem from methodological issues: given 126
that the tests of decision-making differ considerably, results from 127
various studies may  not be comparable. Without careful evaluation, 128
this can lead to a distorted picture of the actual decision-making 129
impairments in PD. 130
1.3. Objectives and structure of the review 131
Our aim is to comprehensively review the pattern of ﬁndings 132
that emerge from studies investigating PD patients’ performance 133
on different decision-making tasks. Our goal is to identify the exact 134
nature of the deﬁcits and the inﬂuence of task characteristics and 135
medication status on decision-making performance in PD. The ﬁrst 136
part of the review introduces the tasks that are commonly used to 137
study decision-making in PD, and discusses the speciﬁc experimen- 138
tal manipulations that are associated with impairments, including 139
medication status. Next, the general ﬁndings of a meta-analysis of 140
38 studies investigating decision-making impairments in PD are 141
presented. The results of the meta-analysis are evaluated and dis- 142
cussed in the concluding section of this article with a particular 143
focus on the implications of these ﬁndings for the role of the basal 144
ganglia in decision-making. 145
2. Decision-making stages and tasks 146
Evidence has shown that decision-making relies on several 147
processing steps which are supported by different brain areas and 148
neurotransmitter systems (Delazer et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 149
2009; Rangel et al., 2008). Decision-making is typically conceptual- 150
ized as a process that involves the representation and assignment of 151
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values and probabilities to different options, from which an action152
then follows from a choice made, after the outcome of the action153
is evaluated (e.g. Rangel et al., 2008). The ventromedial prefrontal154
cortex (VmPFC) (Chib et al., 2009; Fellows and Farah, 2007; Glascher155
et al., 2009; Lebreton et al., 2009), striatum (Brooks et al., 2010; Lau156
and Glimcher, 2008; Litt et al., 2011; O’Doherty et al., 2006) and157
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Croxson et al., 2009; Kennerley158
et al., 2006; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Walton et al., 2007) are159
thought to be crucial for assigning value to available options. Lateral160
prefrontal and parietal cortex (especially lateral intraparietal area,161
superior colliculus and frontal eye ﬁelds) (Glimcher and Sparks,162
1992; Gottlieb, 2007; Kiani et al., 2008; Roitman and Shadlen,163
2002; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001) were found to be important164
for selecting options based on the values assigned to them. Brain165
areas such as the premotor cortex and anterior cingulate cortex166
(Ernst and Paulus, 2005; Van Veen and Carter, 2002) are thought167
to be responsible for movement execution and action monitoring.168
Finally, the dorsal/ventral striatum (Kurniawan et al., 2013; Phillips169
and Everling, 2012; van der Meer and Redish, 2009; Yamada et al.,170
2011), ACC (Cai and Padoa-Schioppa, 2012; Kennerley and Wallis,171
2009; Seo and Lee, 2007; Walton and Mars, 2007) and amygdala172
(Baxter et al., 2000; Trepel et al., 2005) are claimed to be important173
for evaluating the outcomes of the decision-making process. Taken174
together, this body of work supports the idea that decision-making175
consists of several steps mediated by different brain structures,176
amongst which the basal ganglia play an important role.177
Further evidence for the important role of the basal ganglia178
structures such as the striatum in decision making processes comes179
from studies investigating decision making in patients with PD.180
Decision-making in this population has been investigated using a181
variety of tasks. Most of these tasks were designed to assess the182
accuracy of choices between options, based on the assumption that183
people will learn some information (cues) about the options and184
how reliable that information is (validity) in order to maximize185
their reward (i.e. gain the most possible wins over the course of186
the task). Good performance on these tasks necessitates learning187
about the relationship between options, outcomes, and in some188
cases also rewards. The options will have different informational189
content (cues), which may  be indicative of the potential under-190
lying structure of the task (i.e. the associations between the cues191
and the outcome). The task may  provide trial-by-trial informa-192
tion revealing outcome feedback (correct/incorrect), and/or the193
reward for a correct/incorrect outcome (gains/losses). By utilizing194
feedback or reward information it is possible to devise strategies195
that enable the decision maker to maximize their total wins. Out-196
come feedback usually, in the form of binary ‘correct/incorrect’197
information, refers to the performance on a given trial, and is inde-198
pendent of performance on previous trials – in other words it is199
discrete. In some tasks, however, outcome feedback is provided200
in the form of cumulative information; this means that it carries201
information from one trial to the next (e.g. deviation from a target202
value that is set at the start of the experiment), allowing the deci-203
sion maker to monitor their on-going performance as it changes204
over consecutive trials. Despite this basic set up, common for most205
decision-making tasks, there are marked differences between the206
tasks as well.207
2.1. Tasks used to study decision-making in PD208
Tasks used to study decision-making can be divided into two cat-209
egories (see Fig.  1), those that examine decision-making under risk,210
and those examining decision-making under uncertainty. This is211
actually an economically informed distinction originally proposed212
by Knight (1921) and is based on the agent’s sources of knowledge213
regarding outcomes and probabilities. Knight’s distinction between214
risk and uncertainty outlines that decision-making under risk refers215
to situations in which probabilities are known (or knowable) (e.g. 216
games of chance), whereas situations of uncertainty are character- 217
ized as cases where probabilities are neither logically deducible 218
nor can they be inferred from the information presented in the 219
task (Meder et al., 2013; Osman, 2011; Trepel et al., 2005). One 220
factor to bear in mind is that the distinction between tasks that 221
examine decision-making under risk and decision-making under 222
uncertainty is not a clear cut one. One reason for this is that tasks 223
that examine both risk and uncertainty also include a learning 224
component, in which participants attempt to infer the underlying 225
probabilities. This in turn implies that there are likely to be poten- 226
tial differences in performance which is based on differences in 227
the learning processes employed by participants, rather than the 228
underlying structure of the risky situation they are trying to make 229
decision on. This is especially the case in task such as the Iowa Gam- 230
bling Task where differences in performance can be attributed to 231
either differences in learning or differences in risk preference. In 232
many decision-making tasks that involve a learning component, it 233
is not always possible to unambiguously separate out the two. 234
2.1.1. Tasks investigating decision-making under risk 235
When we  make decisions under risk, some estimation of an out- 236
come can be calculated, such as betting on a certain number landing 237
face-up when throwing a dice. Take, for instance, the Game of Dice 238
Task (GDT).  Here, participants are asked to place a bet on a num- 239
ber that will come up on the dice, just before it is rolled. They can 240
choose between (A) single number (e.g. 4), (B) two  numbers (2 or 241
4), and (C)  three numbers (1, 2, 5). They receive outcome feed- 242
back (i.e. the actual result of the dice roll), and information about 243
reward (how much they won  or lost). The task is set up so that 244
the more likely the probability of winning (e.g. option C) the lower 245
the reward. When comparing performance of patients with PD on 246
medication with performance of healthy controls (HCs), the former 247
tended to choose the riskier options A and B more often than the lat- 248
ter (e.g. Brand et al., 2004; Euteneuer et al., 2009). However, when 249
immediate feedback was  removed (i.e. participants did not receive 250
any information about the actual outcome of the dice roll) risky 251
behaviour dropped (e.g. Labudda et al., 2010). 252
An alternative to the GDT is the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT). 253
Participants are presented with a row of 10 boxes which can be 254
either red or blue, and are asked to place a bet on whether a token 255
has been hidden under a red or a blue box. The proportion of red and 256
blue boxes changes from trial to trial. In this task participants are 257
aware of the risk associated with each option, and are expected to 258
adjust their betting behaviour to the number of red and blue boxes. 259
For example, when seven blue and three red boxes are presented, 260
participants are expected to indicate that the token is hidden under 261
a blue box. Following this choice, participants are invited to place 262
a bet (in a form of a percentage of their current task credit) on 263
whether or not they believe their decision will prove to be correct. 264
Cools et al. (2003) reported that compared to age matched healthy 265
controls (HCs) PD patients on medication exhibited abnormal bet- 266
ting behaviour which was  suggestive of impulsivity; they tended to 267
make bets quicker than PDs off medication and HCs. On the other 268
hand, Delazer et al. (2009) showed that in an adapted version of the 269
task (Probability-Associated Gambling Task) PD patients on medi- 270
cation performed just as well as HCs. However, it has to be noted 271
that no measures of impulsivity were included in this particular 272
version of the CGT task. 273
2.1.2. Tasks investigating decision-making under uncertainty 274
In tasks examining decision-making under uncertainty the 275
probabilities associated with different outcomes occurring are 276
unknown. It would be akin to betting on the number 2 coming up 277
on a die, but not knowing if the die rolled from trial to trial is 6-sided 278
or 12-sided. A popular task used to study decision-making under 279
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Fig. 1. Tasks commonly used to study decision-making in Parkinson’s disease.
uncertainty in patients with PD is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).280
In the IGT participants are presented with 100 or so trials, and on281
each trial they are required to choose between four decks of cards.282
Unbeknownst to the participants two of the decks are advanta-283
geous (small gains, but also small losses – consistent selection leads284
to net proﬁt) and two are disadvantageous (large gains, but also285
large losses – consistent selection leads to net loss). Participants286
receive trial-by-trial information about the gains or losses follow-287
ing their selection, and performance is indexed by subtracting the288
overall number of disadvantageous selections from the advanta- 289
geous selections. Here again, the pattern of ﬁndings is mixed. Some 290
studies (Euteneuer et al., 2009; Poletti et al., 2010; Stout et al., 291
2001; Thiel et al., 2003) show that patients with PD make selec- 292
tions consistent with those of a healthy sample, while others show 293
that PD patients make more disadvantageous selections (Czernecki 294
et al., 2002; Delazer et al., 2009; Ibarretxe-Bilbao et al., 2009; 295
Kobayakawa et al., 2008; Mimura et al., 2006; Pagonabarraga et al., 296
2007; Perretta et al., 2005). 297
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The set-up of the Probabilistic Classiﬁcation Learning Task (PCL)298
differs markedly from the IGT primarily because rather than select-299
ing from four options, in the PCL participants predict a binary300
outcome based on a combination of 1, 2 or 3 different cues. Each301
cue is independently associated with each outcome with a ﬁxed302
probability, and each outcome occurs equally often. A good exam-303
ple of a PCL task is the Weather Prediction Task (WPT) (Knowlton304
et al., 1994), which is used widely in studies of procedural learn-305
ing in PD (e.g. Poldrack et al., 2001; Shohamy et al., 2004a; Witt306
et al., 2002). In the WPT, participants are presented with 100 or307
so trials, in which on every trial they see a combination of tarot308
cards (maximum number is four) and from this conﬁguration of309
cards they are asked to predict an outcome (i.e. whether it will be310
rainy or sunny). The actual outcome is determined by a probabilis-311
tic rule based on the combinations of cards, and in actual fact each312
card is partially an accurate predictor of the outcome (Gluck et al.,313
2002). Usually outcome feedback is presented on a trial-by-trial314
basis and in some variations reward information is also presented.315
In general PD patients on medication are thought to be impaired316
on this task (e.g. Knowlton et al., 1996; Mattox et al., 2006; Sage317
et al., 2003; Perretta et al., 2005; Wilkinson et al., 2008; Witt et al.,318
2002), showing limited learning of the relationship between cues319
and outcomes, represented by near chance levels of performance.320
Another type of probabilistic learning task that involves321
decision-making under uncertainty is Probabilistic Reversal Learn-322
ing (PRL). The task consists of two stages, starting with a simple323
probabilistic visual discrimination task. Here participants need to324
learn to choose the one of two stimuli which is associated with325
greater probability of positive feedback. The stimuli usually take326
the form of different coloured patterns presented on a computer327
screen (e.g. Swainson et al., 2000). Participants choosing the ‘cor-328
rect stimuli’ receive positive feedback (e.g. ‘smiley face’ picture) on329
80% of the trials. Half way through the task (usually after 40–50330
trials) the contingencies are reversed without warning, so that the331
previously ‘incorrect’ stimulus becomes correct and vice versa. The332
participants need to be able to alter their behaviour in response to333
changing reinforcement contingencies, and while HCs show adap-334
tive behaviour, PD patients on medication tend to stick to their335
initial choice after the reversal much more often than HCs (e.g.336
Cools, 2001; Cools et al., 2006; Peterson et al., 2009; Swainson et al.,337
2000).338
Procedural Learning Transitive Inference Task (PLTIT) is somewhat339
different from the tasks described above, as it comes in two  ver-340
sions: probabilistic (where the outcome might differ from trial to341
trial, irrespective of participant choices) and deterministic (where342
the outcome is predetermined and depends solely on participants’343
choices). In the deterministic version of the task participants are344
presented with a pair of stimuli, each of which have either positive345
(+) or negative (−) feedback associated with them. Four pairs that346
are typically presented are (A+ B−) (B+ C−) (C+ D−) and (D+ E−). On347
each trial participants are presented with a pair of Japanese symbols348
(meaningless for them) and asked to choose the one more likely to349
be associated with positive feedback. No reward is given for the cor-350
rect answer. Nevertheless, to obtain positive, rather than negative351
feedback, participants need to learn to select the correct stimulus352
in each pair. To do this, they need to learn the transitive relation-353
ship between the stimuli. Stimuli near the top of the hierarchy (e.g.354
A and B) develop positive net associative strengths, whereas those355
at the bottom develop negative net associative strengths (e.g. D356
and E). The probabilistic version of the task differs from the deter-357
ministic in that each of the stimulus pairs presented over trials is358
unique (e.g. AB, CD, EF). In each stimulus pair one of the stimuli is359
associated with a greater probability of receiving positive feedback360
and participants need to learn to choose this stimulus. According361
to Frank et al. (2004) PD patients on medication are more sensi-362
tive to positive than negative feedback, and the evidence from the363
probabilistic and deterministic version of the PLTIT task revealed 364
exactly that. Moreover, the opposite was  found for PD patients off 365
medication, with the results showing that they were reliably better 366
at avoiding negative stimuli at the lower end of the hierarchy. 367
Along the same lines as the PLTIT, the Chaining task also requires 368
participants to learn the ordering of relevant information. In the 369
Chaining task participants learn through trial and error the correct 370
sequence of coloured doors to complete the task. In this computer- 371
based environment participants have to guide a character through 372
4–6 different rooms to reach a goal (an outside world or a hidden 373
treasure). In each room they are presented with a set of three doors 374
of different colours. Participants need to learn which door is cor- 375
rect in each room. When the correct door is chosen participants 376
move on to the next room, and in the ﬁnal room participants reach 377
the outside world/hidden treasure. No monetary reward is usu- 378
ally offered for completing the whole sequence correctly. Contrary 379
to the results of most of the studies described above, PD patients 380
performed just as well as HCs during this task when on dopami- 381
nergic medication, i.e. they were able to learn a correct sequence of 382
doors as quickly as HCs and were as accurate as HCs (Shohamy 383
et al., 2005). However, when tested off medication, PD patients 384
were signiﬁcantly worse than HCs (Nagy et al., 2007; Shohamy et al., 385
2005). 386
Finally, what differentiates Dynamic Decision-making (DDM) 387
tasks from all the aforementioned tasks is that there is an under- 388
lying causal structure between the cue (input) information and 389
the outcome (output), and participants make decisions by directly 390
manipulating the values of the inputs. A good example of a DDM 391
task is the Sugar Factory task, designed by Berry and Broadbent 392
(1984).  It is a computer-based environment in which participants 393
take on a role of a sugar factory manager. Participants usually 394
have about 40 trials to learn to reach and maintain a speciﬁc 395
output value (e.g. level of sugar production) by manipulating the 396
value of the cue (e.g. the number of workers employed) (Berry and 397
Broadbent, 1984). The task is dynamic because the output value 398
changes directly as a result of the actions of the decision maker, but 399
can also change independently of their choices – according to the 400
type of probabilistic structure that is embedded in the task. On  each 401
trial participants receive cumulative outcome feedback informing 402
them of the output value they have achieved over several trials. In 403
general PD patients on medication perform just as well as HCs on 404
this task based on their ability to reach and maintain the output 405
value to the target level (Osman et al., 2008; Rutledge et al., 2009; 406
Witt et al., 2006). 407
2.1.3. Summary of differences in decision-making tasks 408
All of the tasks described above involve an element of learn- 409
ing either through outcome feedback or through information about 410
rewards. Differences in the learning processes employed to infer 411
the underlying probabilities within a task might have direct inﬂu- 412
ence on the results of different studies. Furthermore, none of 413
the tasks involve the same underlying cue–outcome relation- 414
ship, which in itself dictates the probabilities of certain outcomes 415
occurring. In addition, some tasks examine decision-making under 416
uncertainty, whereas others look at decision-making under risk. 417
All this might impact the way people make decisions on these 418
tasks. In fact, human and animal studies suggest that the probabil- 419
ities of different outcomes occurring have direct consequences for 420
shaping the preferences between options (e.g. Bechara et al., 1997; 421
Brand et al., 2006; Delazer et al., 2009; Kahneman and Tversky, 422
1979). Therefore, the decision-making process might look differ- 423
ently when the probabilities of different outcomes occurring are 424
known (decision-making under risk) as compared to when they 425
have to be estimated by the decision maker (decision-making under 426
uncertainty). This needs to be taken into account when investigat- 427
ing decision-making in PD on different types of tasks. Moreover, 428
Please cite this article in press as: Ryterska, A., et al., What are people with Parkinson’s disease really impaired on when it comes to making
decisions? A meta-analysis of the evidence. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.10.005
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelNBR 1850 1–11
6 A. Ryterska et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews xxx (2013) xxx– xxx
the tasks used to study decision-making in PD differ in terms of429
various other characteristics, such as the feedback structure and430
cover stories, which might have a direct impact on PD patients’431
performance as well. Consequently, it is crucial to take these fac-432
tors into account when comparing PD patients’ performance on433
different decision-making tasks.434
Because of the differences in methodologies between the studies435
examining decision-making in PD, the results of these studies are436
difﬁcult to compare directly. Identifying the factors associated with437
experimental design that impact decision-making processes in PD438
could potentially give us more insights into the speciﬁc deﬁcits439
concerning decision-making in these patients. It could also give440
us insights into why there are so many inconsistencies in the pat-441
terns of ﬁndings reported in studies of decision-making in PD. In442
the next section we focus on the potential factors that, based on443
the existing literature, are most likely to lead to deﬁcits: type of444
task environment (uncertain or risky; probabilistic or determinis-445
tic), type of feedback, and medication status of patients (on or off446
medication) (Osman, 2011).447
2.2. Experimental manipulations associated with448
decision-making tasks and their inﬂuence on decision-making in449
PD450
2.2.1. Task environment451
Cue–outcome relationship. The  rule governing the cue-outcome452
relationship in the tasks discussed can be either deterministic or453
probabilistic. In deterministic environments certain cues are invari-454
ably followed by certain outcomes. In probabilistic environments,455
cues predict certain outcomes with a speciﬁc probability. The type456
of rule governing the cue outcome relationship in an environment457
is thought to inﬂuence the type of learning that takes place (Osman,458
2011). For instance, probabilistic environments are thought to trig-459
ger learning that has been described as procedural (Knowlton et al.,460
1994, 1996). If we return to work discussed earlier in the sec-461
tion on the link between cognitive functions and the role of the462
basal ganglia, then there is some evidence that dopamine deﬁciency463
in the basal ganglia leads to impaired procedural learning (e.g.464
Faure et al., 2005; Saint-Cyr et al., 1995; Wilkinson and Jahanshahi,465
2007). In addition, the nigral dopaminergic system has been shown466
to be important for learning to make choices in environments467
with probabilistic reward contingencies (Peterson et al., 2009).468
Taken together, this would mean that PD patients should be more469
impaired when the decision-making environment is probabilistic470
than deterministic, because probabilistic environments typically471
invoke procedural learning that has been suggested to be impaired472
in PD. However, Frank et al. (2004) tested PD patients’ performance473
on two tasks – probabilistic and deterministic versions of the PLTIT,474
and found no signiﬁcant differences in performance between the475
groups. Moreover, an example of a probabilistic decision-making476
environment is DDM tasks, but they also fail to show impairment477
in performance in PDs. Clearly the impact of probabilistic and deter-478
minist cue–outcome relationships on performance in PDs has not479
been settled.480
Risk vs. uncertainty. As suggested before, it is possible that the481
results of the studies conducted thus far differ because the tasks482
employed involve either decision-making under risk (GDT, CGT)483
or uncertainty (e.g. IGT, DDM and PCL) (e.g. Delazer et al., 2009).484
Many of the tasks used to examine decision-making in PD de485
facto measure decision-making under risk. Euteneuer et al. (2009)486
suggested that PD patients are speciﬁcally impaired on decision-487
making under risk (as measured by GDT), but not under uncertainty488
(as measured by IGT). In contrast, Delazer et al. (2009) found PD489
patients were impaired on tasks examining decision-making under490
uncertainty (as measured by IGT), but not under risk (as measured491
by a version of the CGT). Clearly whether risk and/or uncertainty492
lead to poor decision-making in PD is an important but unsettled 493
matter. 494
2.2.2. Feedback structure 495
Studies conducted so far suggest that the feedback structure 496
could potentially inﬂuence PD patients’ performance on decision- 497
making tasks. For example, evidence from fMRI studies conducted 498
on healthy volunteers suggest that ventral striatum might be 499
involved in feedback processing during WPT  task (Poldrack et al., 500
2001; Seger and Cincotta, 2005), which in turn could result in 501
impaired feedback processing in PD patients in whom this struc- 502
ture is affected. This is supported by several studies indicating that 503
impaired performance of PD patients might result from impaired 504
processing of trial-by-trial outcome feedback. PD patients have 505
been shown to be able to make advantageous decisions in a 506
gambling scenario when all the necessary information was explic- 507
itly given, and no outcome feedback was  provided (Minati et al., 508
2011). Furthermore, Shohamy et al. (2004b) compared perfor- 509
mance on the WPT  with outcome feedback and without (e.g. a 510
paired associate (PA) version in which PD patients were pre- 511
sented with cues and outcomes simultaneously). PD patients in 512
the no-feedback condition outperformed those in the feedback 513
condition. Shohamy et al. (2008) interpreted this as evidence for 514
impaired incremental feedback-based learning in PD (Shohamy 515
et al., 2008). Schmitt-Eliassen et al. (2007) replicated these ﬁndings 516
in a modiﬁed version of the WPT  task, in which the no-feedback 517
condition merely observed the cue–outcome associations. How- 518
ever, when Wilkinson et al. (2008) replicated Shohamy et al.’s 519
(2004b) study using similar techniques to Schmitt-Eliassen et al. 520
(2007),  they reported that compared to a healthy age matched 521
group PD patients were impaired on both feedback and no- 522
feedback versions. The ﬁndings of the studies conducted thus far 523
do not provide a clear answer as to whether the presence of 524
feedback inﬂuences PD patients’ performance on decision-making 525
tasks. 526
What adds to the confusion is that tasks used to examine 527
decision-making in PD have utilized two different types of feed- 528
back. In some tasks (e.g. WPT) the feedback is discrete, which means 529
that it only informs people about the success of their actions on a 530
given trial. Such feedback provides very little information about 531
the rule underlying cue–outcome relationship (i.e. task structure – 532
underlying association between cues, outcome probabilities, and 533
rewards), unless it is tracked over time, which puts a stress on 534
working memory. For example, if a given cue is associated with 535
a given outcome 80% of the time, then feedback that informs par- 536
ticipants that on this particular trial the cue was  followed by this 537
particular outcome does not help in any way to discover the rule 538
governing the cue outcome relationship in this task, unless peo- 539
ple have a signiﬁcant degree of exposure to the task. In tasks that 540
use cumulative feedback (e.g. DDM), on the other hand, people are 541
provided with information about their performance relative to a 542
target across several trials. This kind of feedback makes it much 543
easier for participants to discover the rule guiding the cue outcome 544
relationship, because they can track their performance more eas- 545
ily without burdening their working memory. Using the example 546
described above,  if a given cue is associated with a given outcome 547
80% of the time, then feedback that informs participants that on 548
past ﬁve trials this particular cue was followed by this particular 549
outcome on four occasions, makes it easier for participants to ﬁg- 550
ure out what the cue–outcome relationship actually is. In general 551
studies utilizing discrete feedback tend to ﬁnd PD patients to be 552
impaired (e.g. Knowlton et al., 1996; Perretta et al., 2005; Sage et al., 553
2003), whereas studies utilizing cumulative feedback usually ﬁnd 554
decision making in PD to be intact (e.g. Osman et al., 2008, Witt 555
et al., 2002). Consequently, it seems that when informational con- 556
tent of feedback is rich, frequent, or in some cases not provided 557
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at all, these situations seems to assist PD patients in learning and558
decision-making (Shohamy et al., 2004b; Witt et al., 2006).559
2.3. Experimental manipulation associated with medication560
status of PD patients561
In addition to task design, one of the factors that have been pro-562
posed to have a profound effect on PD patients’ performance on563
decision-making tasks is whether they are tested on or off their564
dopaminergic medication. Pharmacological therapy available for565
PD patients focuses on restoring depleted levels of the neurotrans-566
mitter dopamine in the brain. The midbrain dopaminergic system567
is thought to play a crucial role in learning from feedback (e.g.568
Shohamy et al., 2004b)  and reward processing (Hollerman et al.,569
2000; Schultz, 2002). Previous studies suggest that in normal popu-570
lations learning from positive and negative feedback depends on571
the phasic changes of ﬁring of dopamine neurons (e.g. Aubert et al.,572
2000; Floresco et al., 2003). Unexpected reward is associated with573
phasic bursts of activity in dopamine neurons (Schultz et al., 1993),574
while omission of an expected reward results in dips in activity575
(Hollerman and Schultz, 1998). It has been proposed that phasic576
release of dopamine acts as a “temporal difference” error signal577
that indicates whether the occurrence of a reward or a stimu-578
lus signalling reward is better (phasic increase, positive prediction579
error) or worse (phasic pause or dip, negative prediction error) than580
expected; while continued tonic activity signiﬁes that things are581
as expected (Montague et al., 1996, 2004; Schultz and Dickinson,582
2000).583
A decrease in dopamine levels in PD is associated with degen-584
eration of the dopamine-producing cells in the substantia nigra585
pars compacta, and this is thought to result in substantial disrup-586
tion of the processes described above. Consequently, it could be587
hypothesized that PD patients should perform worse in decision-588
making tasks than HCs when tested off medication, when the589
dopamine levels are decreased, but just as well (or nearly as well)590
when tested on medication, which partially restores the dopamine591
levels in the brain. However, evidence suggests that PD patients592
tend to perform better when tested off medication, rather than on593
medication on some tasks such as the WPT, CGT, IGT, PRL or concur-594
rent discrimination task (e.g. Cools, 2001; Cools et al., 2003, 2006;595
Jahanshahi et al., 2010; Kapogiannis et al., 2011; Shohamy et al.,596
2006; Swainson et al., 2000). Several explanations for this phe-597
nomenon have been proposed. Frank et al. (2004) hypothesized that598
dopaminergic medication impairs PD patients’ ability to learn from599
negative feedback. Alternatively, poor performance in decision-600
making tasks may  reﬂect the fact that dopaminergic medication601
causes an overdose of dopamine in parts of the basal ganglia such602
as the central striatum less affected by the disease in the early stages603
(Gotham et al., 1988). It is important, however, to bear in mind that604
several studies have also reported that there are no differences in605
performance on Iowa Gambling Task and Weather Prediction Task606
between patients on and off medication (e.g. Czernecki et al., 2002;607
Wilkinson et al., 2008), which suggests that the effect of medication608
on decision-making tasks in PD is not straightforward.609
2.4. Summary of experimental manipulations that inﬂuence610
decision-making in PD611
It is clear from the ﬁndings discussed that there are candidate612
features of decision-making tasks and experimental factors that613
may  explain the inconsistent pattern of ﬁndings associated with614
decision-making in PD. However, without a detailed evaluation of615
the pattern of ﬁndings reported in each study, there is no basis616
for drawing any strong conclusions. Therefore, we conducted a617
simple exploratory meta-analysis of the main ﬁndings of studies618
employing the tasks reviewed in this article.619
The speciﬁc manipulations that were examined were the 620
decision-making paradigm (decision-making under risk vs. uncer- 621
tainty), environment (probabilistic vs. deterministic), feedback 622
structure of the task (discrete vs. other), and medication status (on 623
vs. off dopaminergic medication). Also, to investigate the proposal 624
that PD patient’s impaired performance is a result of slower rates 625
of learning (i.e. that people with PD are capable of learning about 626
the underlying cue–outcome associations, but require more trials 627
to achieve it) the number of trials in each test was  entered into the 628
analysis as well. The electronic search of databases in January 2013 629
using key words ‘Parkinson’s disease’ and ‘decision-making’ iden- 630
tiﬁed 363 results. Following the examination of titles and abstracts 631
we excluded all reviews and animal studies. Given that we  were 632
only interested in tasks in which successful performance would 633
require intact processing of all stages of the decision-making pro- 634
cess described in Section 2, we  excluded tasks not employing the 635
basic set-up described above. We  also excluded studies which 636
examined PD patients suffering from impulse control disorders (e.g. 637
pathological gambling), unless these studies included PD patients 638
without these disorders and their healthy peers as control groups. 639
Consequently, 32 papers were selected, and further 20 studies were 640
identiﬁed based on reference lists. From the list of 52 studies, 641
those which did not have age-matched healthy participants as a 642
control group were eliminated from the analysis (e.g. Rossi et al., 643
2010). Two studies examining performance of PD patients who had 644
Deep Brain Stimulation surgery were also excluded (Halbig et al., 645
2004; Wilkinson et al., 2011). This resulted in 38 studies which 646
were included in the ﬁnal analysis. Each study was  then classiﬁed 647
according to the four manipulations described above. Binary val- 648
ues were assigned to each of the relevant categories (e.g. ‘patients 649
interviewed off medication’ assigned numerical value of 1, ‘patients 650
interviewed on medication’ assigned numerical value of 2). Each 651
study was described using the appropriate numerical values for 652
each category. For each study the outcome on performance was 653
recorded (i.e. 1, patients with PD performed as well as HCs; 2, 654
showed impairments). The next step of the analysis was to conduct 655
a logistic regression to ﬁnd the task characteristics that could inﬂu- 656
ence the results of studies examining decision-making processes in 657
PD patients. 658
3. Results 659
38 studies from the past 18 years were analyzed (earliest: 1994; 660
most recent: 2012) – 60 separate experiments of decision-making 661
in PD (studies with PD patients ON and OFF med, or with different 662
types of feedback were counted as separate instances of PD patients 663
performing the task – these were labelled as separate tests). PD 664
patients were found to be impaired relative to HCs on 39 exper- 665
iments (65% of all experiments). Logistic regression analysis was 666
performed to assess the impact of the decision-making paradigm, 667
environment (i.e. the rule governing the cue–outcome relation- 668
ship), feedback, and medication status on the likelihood that PD 669
patients would be impaired on decision-making tasks. The crite- 670
rion variable was  whether or not PD patients were impaired on the 671
decision-making task compared to healthy age-matched controls. 672
Only the signiﬁcant results of this analysis are reported. The full 673
model containing all predictors was statistically signiﬁcant, х2(5, 674
N = 60) = 22.75, p < .001, indicating that the model was able to dis- 675
tinguish between impaired and unimpaired PD patients. The model 676
as a whole explained between 33.4% (Cox and Snell R square) and 677
45.5% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in PD patients’ perfor- 678
mance on the decision-making tasks, and correctly classiﬁed 82.1% 679
of cases. 680
As shown in Table 1, two  of the independent variables (feed- 681
back and medication status) made a unique statistically signiﬁcant 682
contribution to the model. Thus the following question can 683
Please cite this article in press as: Ryterska, A., et al., What are people with Parkinson’s disease really impaired on when it comes to making
decisions? A meta-analysis of the evidence. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.10.005
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelNBR 1850 1–11
8 A. Ryterska et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews xxx (2013) xxx– xxx
Table  1
Logistic regression predicting likelihood of impaired performance in PD patients.
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Odds ratio 95% C.I. for odds ratio
Lower Upper
Paradigm 0.826 1.08 0.59 1 0.44 2.28 0.278 18.81
Environment 0.76 0.96 0.63 1 0.429 2.14 0.32 14.05
Feedback 3.222 1.09 8.76 1 0.003 25.07 2.97 211.8
Medication status 2.69 0.8 11.43 1 0.001 14.79 3.1 70.54
Trial  no. 0 0.002 0.6 1 0.43 1 0.99 1
Constant −5.65 1.93 8.56 1 0.003 0.003
be answered: Which experimental manipulations associated with684
decision-making tasks are most likely to generate impairments in per-685
formance in patients with PD? The strongest predictor of impaired686
performance was the presence of discrete feedback, recording an687
odds ratio of 25.1. PD patients presented with discrete trial-by-trial688
feedback were signiﬁcantly more likely to show impaired perfor-689
mance as compared with cumulative feedback or no feedback at all,690
controlling for all other factors in the model. The odds ratio of 14.8691
for the medication status indicated that PD patients on medica-692
tion were signiﬁcantly more likely to show impaired performance693
on decision-making tasks compared to PD patients off medication,694
controlling for other factors in the model.695
4. Discussion696
The result of our meta-analysis revealed that presentation of dis-697
crete feedback and testing patients with PD on medication are more698
likely to lead to poorer performance on decision-making tasks in699
these patients. In light of this, we can now begin to answer the fol-700
lowing two questions: Is general decision-making ability affected in701
PD? How can the deﬁcits identiﬁed in decision-making in PD contribute702
to our understanding of the role of the basal ganglia in decision-703
making?704
4.1. Is general decision-making ability affected in PD?705
One of the main questions regarding decision-making in peo-706
ple with PD is whether it is general decision-making ability that707
is impaired in PD, or is the impairment actually a by-product of708
a deﬁcit affecting a more speciﬁc cognitive function. Based on709
the results of this meta-analysis it seems more plausible that PD710
is associated with speciﬁc deﬁcits in feedback processing which711
is associated with the outcome evaluation stage of the decision-712
making process.713
4.1.1. Evaluation of outcome feedback714
The results of this meta-analysis suggest that PD patients715
are adversely affected by discrete feedback when making deci-716
sions. Impairments in feedback processing in PD are likely to717
affect evaluation of the outcomes, which is the ﬁnal stage of the718
decision-making process, resulting in impairments observed on719
some decision-making tasks in PD. However, the impairments of720
feedback processing in PD seem to be limited to discrete feedback,721
which begs the question: Why  only discrete feedback?722
It can be argued that it is not the presence of feedback per se that723
impairs learning and decision-making in PD, but rather it is the724
absence of information about the cue–outcome relationship. For725
instance, Todd and Hammond (1965) suggested that outcome feed-726
back in most MCPL tasks (which is often discrete) is not informative727
of how people should appropriately weight the cues, which could728
have negative effects on task performance (Hammond et al., 1973).729
Consistent with this view, in many studies in which feedback failed730
to provide critical information about the cue–outcome relationship,731
impaired incremental learning in HCs, similar to that reported in PD 732
patients, was  observed (e.g. Knowlton et al., 1996; Shohamy et al., 733
2004b;  Smith and McDowall, 2006). Moreover, when task relevant 734
information was available through feedback in MCPL tasks it was 735
shown to beneﬁt participant’s performance (Hammond et al., 1973; 736
Harries and Harvey, 2000). An example of an environment in which 737
outcome feedback is directly related to the structure of the under- 738
lying task is DDM task. In DDM tasks cumulative outcome feedback 739
provides participants with important information regarding the 740
cue–outcome relationships, which may  be why PD patients’ perfor- 741
mance is as good as HCs (e.g. Osman et al., 2008). Thus, we  would 742
argue that when a decision-making task is sequential and involves 743
choices which have effects on the reward (e.g. WPT/IGT) or on the 744
outcome (DDM) then a feedback structure that is consistent with 745
this incremental learning will facilitate accurate performance in 746
PD. Discrete feedback, on the other hand, disrupts the incremental 747
process of updating task information, which especially affects the 748
performance of PD patients, in whom the mechanisms responsi- 749
ble for processing and updating information based on prediction 750
errors is already impaired. Therefore, whenever feedback does not 751
provide important information about the task structure, this will 752
affect PD patients’ performance. 753
4.1.2. Medication status 754
The results of the current meta-analysis also suggest that PD 755
patients tend to perform better on decision-making tasks when 756
they are examined off rather than on their usual medication. How- 757
ever, this is not true for all decision-making tasks. This suggests that 758
dopaminergic medication also does not affect the global decision- 759
making ability, but rather some components of this process. 760
The fact that PD patients on medication tend to perform worse 761
on some decision-making tasks, when considered in the con- 762
text of the dopamine “overdosing” hypothesis (Cools et al., 2003; 763
Gotham et al., 1988), suggests that some components of the 764
decision-making process in PD might depend on parts of the brain 765
less affected at the early stages of the disease, which become 766
‘overdosed’ with dopamine after administration of dopaminergic 767
medication. In PD neurodegeneration the striatum progresses in a 768
well-deﬁned manner, with the dorsal striatum affected earlier in 769
the disease than the ventral striatum. Given this, processes that 770
involve the ventral striatum to a greater extent, such as stimulus- 771
reward learning (e.g. MacDonald et al., 2013), are adversely affected 772
by dopaminergic medication in patients with PD. This in turn might 773
explain why PD patients on medication are found to be impaired 774
on some decision-making tasks, for the reason that these tasks 775
may  rely to a great extent on associative stimulus-reward learn- 776
ing processes. It can be hypothesized, therefore, that dopaminergic 777
medication does not impair decision-making per se, instead, PD 778
impairs certain components of the decision-making process, such 779
as outcome evaluation, which in turn relies heavily on reward 780
processing mediated by the ventral striatum. This, in turn, results in 781
poor performance of PD patients on medication on decision-making 782
tasks providing participants with certain types of feedback. 783
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4.2. How can the deﬁcits identiﬁed in decision-making tasks in784
PD contribute to our understanding of the role of the basal ganglia785
in decision-making?786
Given the comprehensive nature of our meta-analysis, we  hoped787
that the factors we included would also give us insights into the788
role of the basal ganglia in decision-making. Basal ganglia have789
been shown to be important with respect to a range of cogni-790
tive functions such as working memory (e.g. Frank et al., 2001;791
O’Reilly and Frank, 2006), habit learning (e.g. Knowlton et al., 1996;792
Grahn et al., 2008), reinforcement learning (Bullock et al., 2009)793
and category learning (Seger, 2008; Shohamy et al., 2008). Cru-794
cially, there are ﬁndings from several studies which suggest that795
basal ganglia might be important for decision-making processes796
(e.g. Brand et al., 2004; Mimura et al., 2006; Pagonabarraga et al.,797
2007). However, as highlighted in this review, not all of the evi-798
dence supports a critical role for basal ganglia in decision-making799
given that patients with PD could perform as well as HCs on a vari-800
ety of decision-making tasks. Furthermore, variability in the effects801
of dopaminergic medication on decision-making in PD along with802
the differences between tasks commonly used to assess decision-803
making in this population has made drawing conclusions about the804
role of the basal ganglia in decision-making difﬁcult, until now.805
Consequently, the aim of this review was to evaluate the evidence806
available from studies on decision-making in PD to identify the key807
factors inﬂuencing the performance of PD patients, which could808
potentially inform us about the role of the basal ganglia in these809
processes.810
Based on the pattern of results obtained from PD patients so811
far it seems that basal ganglia are especially important for eval-812
uating the outcomes of the decision-making process in scenarios813
in which feedback of a particular type is presented. They seem814
to play a crucial role for successful decision-making when dis-815
crete outcome feedback is the only source of information about the816
underlying structure of the task. In such circumstances learning817
about the task takes place mainly by forming stimuli-reward asso-818
ciations, mediated by the striatum. When such learning is impaired819
as a consequence of dopaminergic imbalance in the basal ganglia,820
making optimal decisions becomes especially difﬁcult. The ﬁndings821
from the studies reviewed in this paper suggest that in such cir-822
cumstances dropping the feedback altogether, or replacing it with823
cumulative feedback could be advantageous for decision-makers.824
In addition, the results of this meta-analysis suggest that the825
other key factor that greatly impairs decision-making in PD is dopa-826
minergic medication, which again seems to impair a speciﬁc stage827
rather than a global decision-making process. Considering that the828
most reliable support for the overdosing hypothesis comes from829
studies using discrete feedback structure (such as WPT  or PRL tasks)830
(e.g. Cools et al., 2006; Jahanshahi et al., 2010; Shohamy et al.,831
2006; Swainson et al., 2000), it is possible that the overdosing effect832
also depends on the feedback structure of the task. Overdosing833
of dopamine in PD patients taking l-dopa primarily affects ven-834
tral striatum, a structure which is important for reward processing835
(e.g. Haber and Knutson, 2009), especially for processing of intrin-836
sic reward (e.g. self-rated good performance – how good I think837
I am/achievement – how good I hope to be) (e.g. Lutz et al., 2012;838
Satterthwaite et al., 2012) and outcome feedback (Tricomi and Fiez,839
2008). Therefore, what might actually be impaired in patients with840
PD while on medication is the processing of intrinsic rewards pro-841
vided by outcome feedback. This should not affect PD patients’842
learning when feedback provides information about the underlying843
structure of the task as well. The reason for this is that, if it is easy844
to track one’s own performance and improve performance because845
outcome feedback is tied to the inherent structure of the task, then846
when performance dips decision makers should ﬁnd it easier to847
adapt their strategies to improve their performance. So, there is less848
of a burden on processes concerning intrinsic rewards. However, 849
when the only information feedback provides in a decision mak- 850
ing tasks is whether you were ‘good’ (coherent with participants’ 851
predictions, therefore rewarding) or ‘bad’ (inconsistent with par- 852
ticipants’ predictions, therefore not rewarding), and moreover, is 853
only tangentially connected to the cue–outcome associations, then 854
being able to correctly process intrinsic rewards might be much 855
more important for the learning process. This would mean that 856
overdosing of dopaminergic medication would have the biggest 857
impact on performance when feedback provided in the task was 858
not informative of the underlying structure of the task, hence 859
the successful incorporation of the information provided by feed- 860
back depended on correct reward processing. We  would therefore 861
predict that the more remote the feedback is to the underlying 862
structure of the task, the greater the impairments in PD on medi- 863
cation, and the greater the effect of overdosing. 864
4.3. Conclusion 865
The current review set out to determine the scope of decision- 866
making impairments in people with Parkinson’s disease. This was 867
achieved by investigating the pattern of ﬁndings in decision- 868
making tasks associated with manipulations of task environment 869
(deterministic vs. probabilistic), paradigm (risk vs. uncertainty), 870
feedback (discrete, continuous), number of trials, and medication 871
status of patients. The results suggest that discreet feedback and 872
dopaminergic medication generate the most signiﬁcant impair- 873
ments to decision-making behaviour in PD. The latter adds further 874
support to the dopamine overdosing hypothesis. At the same time 875
we found no evidence that factors such as task environment (proba- 876
bilistic vs. deterministic) or task paradigm (decision-making under 877
risk or under uncertainty) inﬂuence decision-making in PD. The 878
implications of these ﬁndings are that Parkinson’s disease does not 879
lead to a global impairment in decision-making ability, as some 880
studies would propose, but rather impairs processing in the ﬁnal 881
stage of the decision-making process, namely the evaluation of the 882
outcome. We  speculate that this is associated with difﬁculties in 883
processing feedback which does not contain sufﬁcient information 884
about the task structure. This current ﬁnding adds to our under- 885
standing of the role of the basal-ganglia in the decision-making 886
process, pointing to their importance for the reward processing 887
evaluative component of decision-making. 888
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